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CHAPTER I

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PLEASURE

The purpose of this first

.

ehapte~ f~

merely aa introductory de-

lineation of the theory ot pleasure earefUlly worked out DY Aristotle. l

.

The adTaBtage of this initial analysis will consist in ,iTln, us a

tor plotting the theory of Plato.

The souroes for the doctrine of Plato

are scattered, diffieult to interpret and reconcile.
Aristotle is more eonoise ani compact.

d~soussio.

The opiBion of
."

The thesis of Aristotle is treat.d

in, to a .efiniti•• of pleasure ana its jUBtitioatioa.
Aristotelian

~ais

Tke wkele

of pleasure, aoreOTer, ooeupie. a particular plao.

in his well-pl ...e. ethies

an.

thus eaaDles the student of his thought to

judge more easily the ethical value of pleasure in hi. Boheme ot lito.
Ari.totle's iiscussion of pleasuro may De diTiiei into two mai.
parts, a negatiTe &ad a positiTo.2

In tke negatiTe seetion he considers

the arguments of two elasses of thought and estiaatin, their value he
iraw. his own ooaolusien trom their arcume.ts.

By

treati~

his o,po•••te

aDd are enabled to comprehe.i moro fully the explaaatioB of his staa••

1 Aristotle's theory of pleasure is taken from Book X ot the NichGaaoheaa
Ethics.
2 A.J. Festugiere, Ari.tote: Le Plai.ir, BiDlietheque de. Texte. Philesopkiques, Liaraire PailespiTque J. Vria, Paris, 1936, xx.
I

2

The exponent of the first olass

0

.'

f thought is Eudoxus, who prese:b.ts

two arguments, whioh maintain the thesis that pleasure is the Sovereign Good,
f~ ~f'~TOV, and so beoomes the ultimate aim of all our aotions in 1ife. 3

Without displaying the arguments, since they

~re

the subjeot of objeotions

offered by the seoond class of opponents disoussed by Aristotle, we may
hurriedly dismiss Eudoxus as does Aristotle himself.

Aristotle is willing to

aooept the premises of Eudoxus' arguments, but ,praws from tilem a more moderate
oonolusion.

The arguments do not prove that pleasure is identified with the

Supreme Good, and, therefore, is not the final end of life, but they merely
demonstrate that pleasure must be oonsidered as a good.
agreement with Eudoxus, in so
Aristotle passes quickly to

~ar

~he

Fundamentally in

as he accepts the premises of the arguments,

more serious refutation of the second group

of adversaries.
The arguments of the second class of thought Aristotle treats with
greater care and detail. 4

Evidently, he considers them of more importance ....

The arguments, though in the tenth book of the Nichomachean Ethics

they are

not stated as belonging to any definite man or group, may be identified with
the thesis and proofs of the Platonic school headed by Speusippus.

Their

contention is that pleasure far from being the Supreme Good is not a good
at all.

3 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, translated by W.D. Ross, IX.

4

Aristotle, edited by W.D. Ross,
1172 b 10-25.
Ibid., 1172 b 35.

11 vols.

Works of
Clarendon Press, Oxford:-

f
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Aristotle makes short work of Speusippus' first two arguments,
which are treated in the manner of two objections to the proofs Eudoxus
presented in the defense of his thesis.
which all things aim is not necessarily
with disdain.

That is nonsense.

Speusippus objects that, "that at
g~od.• " 5
.. t4;

Aristotle dismisses him

If the animals alone sought after pleas-

ure the point might be maintained, but not when "intelligent creatures do
so as well."6 st. Thomas in commenting on t~s section of the Ethics
succinctly puts it: "quia non est possibile quod naturale judicium in omnibus fallatur."7
Speusippus attacks the second argwaent ot contraries, asserting
that if pain is an evil and an object of aversion, it does not follow that
pleasure must be good and an object of choke.
is the basis of Aristotle's response to this.

A faot of common experience
Speusippus wishes pain to

have for its contrary another evil, which he oonsiders to be pleasure; and
pain and pleasure would be opposed to one another as the very great is to*
the very little.

But pleasure, then, would have to be an objeot of aver-

sion just as pain and it is manifest that people avoid pain as an evil, and
make pleasure the object of their ohoice.

Therefore it is good.

Aristotle oontinues his opposition to the doctrine of Speusippus
by breaking down his objeotions.

However, the remaining objections of

5 Ibid., 1172 b 35.
6 Ibid., 1173 a 5.
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Libros Ethicorum ad Niohomachum, XXI. Opera
Omnia, 25 vols. Typ:rs-Petrilfiaccadori, 1Jr66, Lib. X, lect7 II, 330 b.

4
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speusippus are leveled at arguments independent of the proofs ot Eudoxus.
Pleasure, the adversary claims, is not a good, because good pertains to the genus ot quality, but pleasure is not a quality.
denies the conclusion that therefore it

tQI~ows

Aristotle

that pleasure is not good,

because happiness itself and the other forms of virtue are not qualities.
The argument proTes too much.

It is further pointed out by st. Thomas in

his commentary: "Bonum enim dicitur non

sol~in

qualitate sed etiam in

omnibus generibus."8
Speusippus further persists that good 1s determined, while
pleasure is unlimited, for it admits ot degrees.
tinction Aristotle clears this hazard.

By making use of a dis-

Pleasure can be said to be more or

less in a concrete subject, because the subject participates in the torm of
pleasure more or less, but taken in the abstract pleasure 1s one and simple,
eTen as the good, or justice or any ot the other virtues.

In this sense

there is no question ot degree.

~

By reducing pleasure to a movement or generation Speusippus hopes
to uphold his point, for movement or generation is imperfect
hinders pleasure from being the good, which is perfect.

and this

For his answer

Aristotle makes use ot his doctrine on motion already treated in the
Physics.

Motion and generation require time for their oompletion and by

reason of this they are termed imperfect, but pleasure is like
does not require time, in an instant it is accomplished.

8 Ibid., Lib. X, lect. III, 332 a.

~ision,

it

Pleasure must be

~-···----------------------------------~I
5
viewed as a whole. oomplete at every instant.

.'

It is maintained. of oourse,

that "pain is a laok of that whioh is aooording to nature and pleasure is
the replenishment,"9 but all generation supposes a oommon subjeot.
ing to Speusippus this is the body.

Aooord-

.. ..,

In this he is mistaken. for that whioh

feels pleasure is not the body, but the soul.

There is a oonfusion, there-

fore, between the restoration of the natural state and pleasure, whioh results thereby.

MDreover, it is olear that tht objection restricts the

generality of pleasures to one single species, namely, the corporal
pleasures, for the examples ot pleasure and pain are those conneoted with
There are many of the other pleasures, tor instance, the

nutrition.

pleasures of learning, whioh presuppose no pain and theretDre are not oonnected with a replenishment.
The final objection reters to the displaying ot the disgraoeful
pleasures as a proot that pleasure is not good.

It may be denied simply

that these so-oalled pleasures are really pleasant, for things are not

.~

sweet or bitter to those suffering from a vitiated taste, nor can whiteness be attributed to those things which seem to be so to a person suffering trom a disease of the eye.

No more should we consider as pleasures

those which seem to be pleasant to one of a vioious oonstitution.

It may

be further answered that. although all pleasures are desirable, yet not in
every case.

9 Ross.

To be wealthy is a good thing. but not When it requires the

1173 b 5.

f
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betrayal of our ideals, or again, health is a good thing, but not if it requires eating everything.
souroes.

They are pleasures, but not by reason of these

There are various speoies of pleasure.

noble souroes, some from base sources.

Some are derived from

One wpo is not just oannot ex-

perienoe the pleasure proper to the just, and the same applies to the
pleasures of musio and the others.
To conclude the negative seotion of

~s

treatise Aristotle submits

three proofs that pleasure is not in itself and universally good.
Pleasures, depending upon their souroes, belong to diverse species, of whioh
certain ones are good, others are bad.

An illustration of this is the

pleasure, which oomes from the praise of a friend and that from the praise
of a flatterer.

Secondly, though the pleasures of ohildhood are many and

wonderful, one would scarcely desire to go through his whole life with the
mind of a child, nor even i f pain were never to be our lot as a result,
would we choose the pleasures which arise from disgraoeful aotions.
Finally, ·there are some things which men would be eager for, even granting
that no pleasure is attached to them, for example, seeing, remembering,
knowing, and having virtue.

"Id autem quod est per se bonum, tale est, sine

quo nihil est eligibile, ut patet de felicitate."lO
We have reached now the positive seotion of Aristotle's dis•

cU8sion, whioh is the more important, because of his valuable and permanent
contributions to the intrioate problem of pleasure. ll Aristotle enters

10 St. Thomas, Lib. X, 1eot. IV, 335 b.
11 Ross, 1174 a 10.

f
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upon his own disquisition on pleasure by explaining

.'

its nature from whioh

he for.mulates a definition and ooncludes to oertain properties.

He then

reveals how pleasures aocording to the difterence ot their operations ditter
in kind or speoies and also in goodness or

.b~dness.

Pleasure is concerned with activity or operation.

Hence,

Aristotle begins by explaining what he means by pertect activity and tor his
model he uses sensation.

Sensation is the conjition ot a sense aoting in

relation to something sensible, which is the objeot of the sense.

Two

things must be considered in sensation, the principle of the aotivity, which
is the sense, and the sensible, which is the objeot of the operation.
order that the aotivity be perfect, both must be in good condition.

In
Hence,

actlvity is pertect when a sense which is in good condition acts in relation
to the most exoellent of its objeots, or, to use Aristotlets own definition,
"the best aotivity is that of the best-oonditioned organ in the relation to
the finest of its objects. ft12
Aristotle now shows that pleasure is the perfeotion ot activity.

We see that the same operation, which has just been defined as most

pertect is also the most pleasant.

"Ubicumque enim invenitur in aliquo cog-

nosoente
operatio- pertecta, ibi etiam invenitur operatio delectabilis."13
.,
Not only in respect ot all the senses, but even in respect to thought and
oontempleation the most oomplete or perfeot is the most pleasant.

.

It,

theretore, the perfect aotivity is pleasant, the most perfeot is the most

12 Ross, 1174 b 15.
13 st. Thomas, Lib. X, lect. VI, 338 b.

f

pleasant, it follows that activity, in so far as it is perfect, is·'pleasant.
Pleasure is the perfection of activity or that whioh completes activitye
But in what way does it complete a.cti vi ty?
doctor, for example, are not the cause in
being healthy.

e~ctly

Health and the

the same way of a man's

Health acts in the manner of a form, the doctor acts in the

manner of an agent.

Pleasure is akin to health in a similar way, for it

completes activity as a form, while the

sense~r

the intellect well-disposed

toward its most suitable object acts in the manner of an agent.
perfici t operationem non efficienter· sed formali ter. ,,14.
also a two-fold formal perfection.

"Delectatio

But there is

One is intrinsic and constitutes the

very essence of a thing, but the other is that which supervenes the thing
already constituted in its own species and may be called extrinsio.
Pleasure is not as a form intrinsic and constituting the essence of the activity, but it supervenes as the bloom or beauty of youth, not existing, as
it were, of the essence of youth, but as a certain consequent of the good
disposition of the oauses of youth.

~

Pleasure likewise follows upon the

good condition of the causes of activity.
From the nature of pleasure now determined we may consider the
three oonsequent properties disoussedby Aristotle.

Pleasure will endure

in any activity as long as the object be it sensible or intelligible is in
a suitable or apt condition and the sense or intellect, the "causa agens,"
is working.

The reason for this is that when both the aotive and passive

factor remain in the same disposition and are related to each otaer in the

14 Ibid., Lib. X, lect. VI, 339 a.

f
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same way the same effect also remains.

But no pleasure can be oontinuous and it ia a fact of common
experience that no one is actually oontinuously pleased.
this lies in the fact that there is labor
pleasure completes.

i~volved

The reason for

in the activity whioh

Our bodily organs, the neoessary instruments of

aotivity, are changed from their good disposition by reason of the
which is joined to aotivity.

A sensitive

op~tion

mo~ion.

is immediately pro-

duced by the oorporeal organ, an intelleotual operation works mediately
through the sensitive powers. whioh are produoed by oorporeal organs.
Continual activity breaks down the good oondition of the bodily organs and
destroys the perfect activity and consequently pleasure.
We see here also the reason why new things give greater
pleasure.

A new thing attracts more intense and attentive aotivity, which,

of oourse, increases the pleasure in proportion.

Afterwards. when an ao-

tivity becomes routine or accustomed the activity is more negligently
formed and the activity is less perfeot.

per~

Naturally the pleasure also

deoreases.
Lastly we may consider the appetibility of pleasure, why all
people seek after it.

It is reasonab. that all Should desire pleasure,

because there is in us all a natural desire to live.
perfection consists ina oertain activity.

Life in its ultimate
•
Pleasure being that which com-

plates or perfects activity, it neoessarily completes life itself, which
all so greatly desire, and pleasure beoause of its connection becomes also
an object of desire.

f

10

.'

Aristotle suggests a doubt whether we choose pleasure for the
sake of life, or life for the sake of pleasure.

However, though pleasure

and activity are so intimately wrapped together that there oannot be one

'!i thout the other, yet activity seems to be ,prior to pleasure a.nd of pri;.;. 4;

mary importance.

Activity, and therefore, life, should be the principle

object of desire.lS
Having considered the nature of p l~sure and its conditions
along with a brief discussion of some of the properties flowing from the
nature, Aristotle proceeds to his last point, the differentiation of
pleasures both as to kind and to goodness.
We might accept it almost as a principle that those things which
are different in kind are perfected or completed by perfections, which also
differ in kind.

Pleasure is a perfection of aotivity so that as aotivities

differ in species so must the pleasures which are proper to them.

Certain-

ly it is nsnifest that the activities of the intellect differ in kind fro..
the activities of the 'senses, and the senses themselves are differentiated
from one another according to their objects and powers, which are the
principles of the activities.

And in respect to artificial activities we

f

see the same thing, for a painting, which is distinctive for its pleasing
colors is different from a photograph, which is pleasing by reason of its
faithfulness and clarity in exactly representing its objects.

IS W.D. Ross, Aristotle, revised edition, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1930·

229.

12
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to a good program on the radio destroys our aotivity of reading a serious
book.

From this and his other oonsiderations Aristotle believes that eaoh

aotivity different in kind has pleasures proper to it whioh also differ in
kind.
We are prepared now for the last and most important disoussion.
What pleasures are good and what pleasures are bad?
be oonsidered proper to man?

Of those that

~e

What pleasures should

thought to be good what

kind of pleasure or what pleasure should man pursue?
To answer these questions Aristotle returns again to the differenoe of aotivities.

They differ in respeot of goodness and desirability,

so that some we should choose, others we should avoid, while still others
might be said to be in a neutral state.

Since every aotivity has its

proper pleasure, then "the pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and
that proper to an unworthy activity is bad."l9
pleasures

d~ends

The goodness of the

upon the goodness of the activity.

Aristotle introduces here the question of a distinotion between
the pleasures proper to activities and the pleasures proper to desires,
also the distinction between the purity and impurity of the various
ple~sures,

especially of the senses.

interesting though

We omit the discussion, for,

it might be, it is of minor importance to our thesis.

But what pleasure is proper to man?

In the oase of the animals

the question is easily decided by referring to the proper activities and

19 Ibid., 1175 b 25.

f
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functions of the various species of animal.
involved~

But the case of man

~!'

~s

more

for what is a delight to some is real pain to others, although

all men are of one and the same species.
activities and pleasures of the

The reason appears to be that the

ani~~ls fol~ow

upon their natural inclina-

tion, but the activities and pleasures of man spring from
not determined to one course.

We

find~

reason~

which is

therefore, the same things to some

are painful and hateful, to others delightful;.and desirable.

But just as

in the matter of taste, sweet things do not appear the same to one suffering from a fever as to one who is healthy, so pleasures differ to those
better or

~rse

disposed or equipped with reason to judge.

Since we abide

by the healthy man's verdict in the matter of taste it is reasonable that
the distinctly human pleasures should be those in

which~he

wise and

virtuous man delights, because he possesses a more sane and sound reason
and judgment.
Virtue~

therefore, is the measure we should follow in all human.

affairs and those are the true pleasures which seem so to the virtuous man.
"If things he finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is not to be
wondered at; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things
are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this
condi tion. ,,20

The pleasures which the virtuous man repudiates are not

really pleasures at all. but only to t hose whose reason and appetite have
been perverted.

The pleasures which all confess are base are only

pleasures to men corrupt.

20 Ibid., 1176 a 20.

t

~-.----------------------------llr,I
Aristotle thus concludes his treatise o.a the universal na~~re of
pleasure.

Sur;nning up, we

panion of activity.

ma~r

say that pleasure ::::is the inseparable

COID-

Pleasure ts not a norm rese . . ved to a particular type

of life, but extends to every form of life.

It <::)annot be claimed alone by

the devotees of pleasure for such a life recogni:2:es only the pleasures of the
body, 'which, if pleas'lres at all, are only so in
belongs to all life

a secondary way.

Pleasure

properly human, by which Ap.stotle means all virtuous

life vmich being founded upon the exercise of vir-tue or good activity is in
itself pleasant.
lJow too we can see Aristotle's plan in breating of pleasure in his
book of

Ethics, which purposes to find the ult~ate end at which all our

particular actions aim as their chief good.

The

happiness, an acti vi ty consisting, e.s Festigiere

end of human nature is
asserts in summing up his

own treatise on Aristotle, in the "exercise of al 1 those virtues which make
us truly men and in its essence happiness is the

~ull blossoming of our

faculties properly human. 1121

inseparable companion of

Pleasure being, the

acti vi ty there exists a necessary link between pl-easure and the ultimate end
of our life.

To quote Festugiere again, "happine ss implies pleasure not only

because we cannot live without a certain amount 0=£ corporal pleasure, not
only because pleasure is a helpful condition or a

necessary accidental of

h appiness, but in virtue of the very nature of plE3asure. ff 22

•

Happiness is

virtuous activity and this activity is necessaril~ completed by pleasure.

2JFestugiere, LXI.
Ibid., LX:r.

f
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CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF HEDONISM IN PLATO

After the systematic treatment of Aristotle's theory of pleasure in
the previous chapter it is possible that the remainder of the thesis may be a
little disappointing.

No such system will be jpund in Plato's writings, in

fact,many have gone awry by trying to interpret Plato's doctrine in such
fashion, fixing it according to definite lines of a system. l
is no fault in Plato.

However, this

It is due to the riohness and variety of his thought

and the oharacter of his writings.

Plato was not content like Aristotle to

express his mind in a colorless, philosophical style.

Plato's ideas are

always placed in a definite setting and atmosphere and worked out in a personal, human way.

He has always been acclaimed as much as an artist and

dramatist as a great thinker.
Such a presentation has created difficulties, nevertheless, for
the student of Plato's thought.

One il forced to assemble Plato's ideas on

a particular subjeot from diverse places and divest them of any partioular
dramatio or stylistic value to reaoh the bedrock of his true thought.

On

the other hand, misinterpretations oan especially occur in Plato by
divoroing any group of his words from their particular oontext, whioh'very
often adds a distinot oolor and tone to his opinion.

I

A.E. Taylor, Plato ~ ~ ~ His Work, Dial Press Ino., New York,

1936, 23.

15
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Just such difficulties beset this thesis. but we will at~empt to
sift all of Plato's references to pleasure and set them down in an orderly
fashion with the purpose of determining as accurately as possible what is
Plato's theory of pleasure.
The order of the treatment is to be based upon the clear-out
outline which Aristotle follows in his exposition. namely. in this ohapter
we shall disouss the negative side of Plato's jbeory. what pleasure is not.
considering Plato's refutations of various opponents.

In the following

chapters the positive side of the doctrine will be explained.

In the next

chapter what pleasure is. its nature and variety. will be expounded.

Finally

we shall. in the last ohapter. examine the ethical value of pleasure in
Plato's philosophy of life.
It must be noted that it is not the intention of the thesis to
make a comparison or judge the respective merits of the treatment of the subject by the two ancient and eminent philosophers.

The purpose throughout

~

to set down the facts of Plato's theory without approving or disapproving of
them.

The advantage of having considered Aristotle's theory first is that it

furnishes a touohstone for arranging and expounding Plato's theory.
The exposition of Plato's theory of pleasure will

~

based

generally upon the ideas expressed in the Phi1ebus. the Republic, the
Gorgias. the Protagoras. the Phaedo. and the Laws.
In the dialogues in which Plato treats most fully the subject of
pleasure there is only one opposing view. which Plato persists in refuting.
His opponents hold that pleasure is identified with the good and therefore

f

is to be sought after in all our aotions as the ultimate end of

li~.

So

eager is Plato to combat and overthrow this doctrine that he seems to spend
his energy in arguing in this negative fashion, rather than in explaining
positively his own view, which, however, is

~plioitly
•

contained.

The en-

4""

tire Gorgias, one of Plato's longer dialogues, is nothing but a vigorous objection to the hedonistio principle of life.

However, since pleasure was the

motive foroe for the aotions of the people of

~e

street and Sophists by

their own admission, or by the ultimate reduction of their prinoiples were
exponents of Hedonism, Plato's vigorous opposition was justified.
A oomparatively early mention in Plato of the ethioal doctrine of
pleasure occurs in the dialogue, Gorgias.' Gorgias himselt is introduoed into
t~e

dialogue only for a brief disoussion, and then he departs from the soene

in favor of his more outspoken disciples, Polus and Callicles.

Polus

enunoiates the direot moral issue,2 when he objects to Socrates' ~tatement
that to do wrong is a greater evil than to suffer wrong, for, Polus

declare~

he is envious of the liberty of doing whatever one thinks f1 t, even to killing or imprisoning anyone he pleases.

Rhetorio, to determine the purpose ot

whioh the disoussion began, gives just suoh a power, beoause it makes its end
Pleasure, and enables anyone to obtain what he desires.

Anr::.appeal is made by

Polus to the example and opinion ot the majority of men to justify his
belief.

2 Plato, Gorgias, V, translated by W.R.M. Lamb.
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1925, 469 c.

Loeb Classioal Library,

f

There is little progress made in the argument, however, uhtil
Polus finally admits that to do wrong is more shameful,~rXLo~, than to suffer wrong, though it is not more evil.

To the foul or shameful is opposed

the fair or noble,K~~:V, and to Polus there is a distinotion between the
fair and good, between the foul and evil.

.~

Soorates leads him to agree to the

definition that the fair is that whioh gives either pleasure, benefit or
both, for our standard of judging fine oolor, \ound, or figures always is
that they are of same use or confer pleasure.

Suoh a definition appeals at

once to Polus, for the fair is defined by the pleasure and good.
unaware of what must follow from this.

But he is

The shameful must be that whioh

oauses harm. pain or both and the shameful is thus defined by the opposites
of pleasure and good, namely, pain and evil.
It is an easy step now for Soorates to show that, although doing
wrong does not exoeed suffering wrong in the matter of pain, yet it is
fouler by reason of an exoess of evil and no one, surely, would ohoose that

~

which is more evil.

Henoe, no one would ohoose to do wrong rather than to

suffer it.
But we still have a seoond point to prove, "whether for a wrongdoer to pay the penalty is the greatest of evils," as Polus supposes, "or to
esoape the penalty is greater."'

Soorates demonstrates his opinion by show-

ing that the "patient" reoeives an effeot of the same kind as the actfon of
the agent, for example, if the striker strikes hard or quiok, the thing

, Ibid., 476 a.

!

19

struck is struck in the same way.
fers good.

.'

Just punishment. however, is fair and con-

Therefore, he who suffers it is benefitted and is relieved from

badness of soul.

Further, injustice, the vice of the soul, is the most

shameful of all things, not by reason of t4e pain it oauses, but by reason of
the harm it brings.

And whatever oonfers the greatest harm must be the

greatest evil in the world.

Justice, on the oontrary, Whioh relieves us of

this evil, must be the fairest of all things ••Now paying the penalty imparts to us justice and relieves us of injustioe.

The true use of rhetoric,

therefore, would be, not to obtain whatever pleasure we desire, even protecting us from penalty, but to preserve us from wrongdoing, or if we should
do wrong, to secure punishment and thus relieve us of the greatest evil.
Polus is thus dismissed to admit a more vigorous and more dangerous opponent, who is a thorough-going Hedonist, sincere and oonfident in his
conviotions.

The fair-mindedness of Plato and his eagerness for the truth,

we might mention here, are nowhere more evident than in this soene.

In the.

person of Callioles Plato puts the strongest defense of the hedonistio doctrine, a defense,whioh even its ablest followers oould soarcely equal.
Ca1lioles introduoes immediately the distinction, familiar to
readers of Plato and the writers of the period, between nature and convention,

9>,jQ'l&S -

v:res.

In one full sweep he pushes aside the ourrent code of

morality as oonventional, "made by the laws of the weaker sort of men to
prevent the stronger from taking advantage of them."

But the law of nature

decrees otherwise, and "it is obvious in many cases, that ••• right has been

,

decided to oonsist in the sway and advantage of the stronger over ~e
weaker. 114
Oallicles goes on to chide Socrates for remaining in the pursuit of
philosophy, which is a fine thing for a young, lad to toy with, but is no fit
ocoupation for a mature man, sinoe it hinders him from attending to more
praotioal duties and renders him helpless as a child and unfit to protect
himself against the encroachments of unjust me,.
There is no doubt about Oa11icle8 1 opinion, for he i. olear and
outspoken, qualities, which Socrates is not loath to commend.

Here is a

worthy opponent to test his mettle and prove the strength of Hedonism, if it
be possible.
Socrates proceeds with his usual definition of terms.
are the better and determine what is right.

The stronger

But Who are the stronger?

Callicles makes it clear that he is not referring to the physioal1y stronger,
but to the better and the wiser, "who should have rule and advantage over ...
the weaker peop1e. n5 Advantage? queries Socrates. A dootor is wiaer in the
matter of proper nourishment, and therefore, he should have more food?
the weaver is wiser and should have more olothes?
wear the biggest shoes?

Or

Or the shoemaker should

In what respeot 1s the superior man to have the ad-

vantage of the larger number?
Irritated Callic1es now develops his view more fully.
are "men of wisdom and manliness in public affairs.

The better

Theae are the persons

who ought to rule our oities and justice means this, that these should have

45 Ibid., 483 d.
Ibid., 490 a.
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more than other people, the ruler than the ruled. n6 They must. thell,
socrates rejoins, have more than themselves, for they must be "selfcontrolled, self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and the desires that are
in themselves. ,,7

Callicles' frank reply to. t~is is that temperance is non-

sense, for no one can be happy when he is enslaved.

To live rightly we

should let our desires be strong as possible and satisfy each desire by our
intelligenoe and manliness.

People regard

lio~tiousness

as disgraceful

only beoause they oannot achieve all the pleasures they desire.

stones and

corpses would be extremely happy, if to want nothing were happiness.
The fables of the sieve and the jars are brought forth by Socrates
to answer Callioles.

The licentious man's soul is like a sieve, which is

constantly being filled up and leaking out.

No matter how muoh such a man

attempts to satisfy his cravings he never reaches satiety.

Far better is

the life of the self-controlled man, who keeps his sOl1l well-ordered and content with what it possesses.

A further oomparison may be stressed

in

the~

example of the two men having many jars, one filled with honey, a second
with milk, and so forth.

These supplies are not readily available. but can

be obtained only through strenuous labor.

One of the men has good jars and

onoe he fills them is at ease, but the other possesses leaky and decayed
jars, so that he must be filling them constantly with a great deal of
trouble.

So it is with the self-controlled and the licentious man.

not manifest whioh of the two lives i8 the happier?

;

Ibid., 491 d.
Ibid., 491 e.

Is it

f

Plea8ure oonsists ~n a oon-

All this has no effect on Oallicles.

stant filling up and when one has had his fill he oan have no more pleasure
than a stone.

The life of pleasure is eating When hungry, drinking when

thirsty, and having all the other desires

an?

satisfying them.

Soorates

;;. 47

abashes' Callioles by suggesting also that "a man who has an itch and wants
to soratoh, and may soratoh in all freedom, oan pass his life happily in
onntinually soratohing. H8

Oal1icles is bound.to admit on his own prinoiples

that even suoh a life would be pleasant and happy.
Callioles is no longer pleased with the trend of the disoussion,
but he need not have allowed such a turn, as Soorates suggests, had he distinguished between the good and bad sorts of pleasures.

Is there no dis-

tinction of pleasures, or is pleasure the same as the good, or is there
some pleasure whioh is not good?

To be oonsistent Oallio1e8 must maintain,

as he admits, that pleasure and good are the same. 9
Oallioles is thus mere unoonditional enjoyment.

The good in the mind of

Soorates introduoes the

question of opposites to prove that there must be a distinotion.

...

A man oan-

not possess health and disease, for example, in respeot to his eye at the
same time, for they are inoompatible.

To speed and slowness, even to good-

ness and happiness, and badness and wretchedness, to all classes of opposites the same thing must apply.

To this Oallicles assents, but he has al-

ready asserted that being hungry is painful and eating While hungry is

8 Ibid., 494c.
9 Ibid •• 495 a.
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pleasant, and the same with being thirsty and drinking.

It is evicfent then

that pain and pleasure occupy the same subject at the same time, and depart
at the same time, for when one ceases to be hungry he ceases to feel pleasure
in eating.

The good and bad, however, cannot exist simultaneously in the

same subject, therefore, pleasure is different from the good.
The argument may be oonsidered in a slightly varied form.
good men are the brave and the wise; the

cowar~ly

The

and the fools are bad.

But both the foolish and the wise feel pleasure almost equally, the fool,
perhaps, feels even more, for instance. in war, when the enemy retreats, and
in the opposite circumstances. when the enemy advances, both alike experience
pain.

Now it·is agreed upon that the good are good by the presence of good

things, and the bad are bad by the presenoe of bad things.

Consider then

what we must conclude, if pleasure is the same as good and pain is the same
as bad.

The more pleasure which a man experiences the better he becomes and

in our previous example shall we say that the bad man, who feels more
pleasure, is made better than the wise man, who is already good?

-

CUllicles is, therefore, forced to abandon his former position and
he tries to escape by deolaring that all along he really believed that there
was such a distinction as good and bad between pleasures.

Those which are

beneficial, conferring health or strength and the like are good, the opposite are evil. IO

In like manner there are good and bad pains.

admission we reach the oonclusion of our whole argument.

10

Ibid.,

499

b c d.

With this

Pleasure is not

t

r
the norm of our conduot, but the good, which is distinct from it.

.'

All our

actions should be performed with the good in view, and pleasure too is for
the sake of the good.

To determine the pleasures that are good for us we

need a man with professional skill and knowle4ge, a knowledge Whioh is
deeper and more true than the mere art of rhetoric, whioh seeks only to
gratify us with pleasures without inquiring whether they are good or bad.
'So there is my acoount of the matter~ and I say that this
is the truth; and that, ,if this is true, anyone as it
seems, who desires to be happy must ensue and praotioe
temperanoe, and flee licentiousness, eaoh of us as fast
as his feet will oarry him, and must oontrive, if
possible, to need no oorreotion; but if he have need of
it, either himself or anyone belonging to him, either an
individual or a oity, then right must be applied and they
must be corrected, if they are to be happy. This, in my
opinion, is the mark on whioh a man should fix his eyes
throughout life; he should ooncentrate all his own and
his city's efforts on this one business of providing a
man who would be blessed with needful justice and temperance; not letting one's desires go unrestrained and in
one's attempts to satisfy them -- an interminable
trouble -- leading the life of a robber. For neither to
any of
fellow men can such a one be dear, nor to
God •••

itS

Akin t

0 th~s

argument between Soorates and Callicles over the ad-

vantages of rhetorio whose aim is pleasure and of philosophy whose aim is
f

the good is the debate in the Philebus between Socrates and Protarohus.
The dialogue opens with the direot statement of its aim to prove clearly
whether the life of pleasure or the life of wisdom oan be the good and happy

11 Ibid., 507 d e.
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life for all men.

.'

To express it in the terms already used in the gorgias.

whether pleasure rather than intelligence is the good.
Socrates definitely states in the very beginning what he means by
the good, so that the goal of the discussion

c,

~ill

be true and clear.

The

;.;. 4'7

good for man is a condition and state, ~ ~I ~

\ ,J, tC.C7£' .. ,~,
'i1

1(01.

of soul which can

make any man's life happy.12 With this definition Protarchus is also in
accord.

The question, therefore, to be

deoide~is

whether pleasure or

thought, or even something else is this state and condition.
The question of the kinds of pleasure is broaohed by Socrates and
he immediately enters upon a brief delineation of the ever troublesome and
important problem of the one and many.

Since this section of the dialogue

has little influence on the argument we are.now considering, it is not to the
point to summarize the thought content here.

Indeed, it seems to confuse the

issue for Socrates and Protarchus at the moment. so they leave it aside to
decide apart the primary issue.
Some notion of the nature of the good would make it clear whether
pleasure or thought fulfil the proper requirements.
is neoessarily something perfect or
t

,

self, ('(" VCI v.

,

complete,r~~~ov,

The good, it is agreed,
and sufficient in it-

But what does experience and reason show us to be the case in

the life of pleasure or of thought considered separately?

Protarchus at

first believes that he could be supremely happy spending his whole life in
the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures with no need for wisdom or

12 Cf. Plato, Philebus. III, translated by H.N. Fowler.
Library, Wm. Heinemann, L9ndon •. 19Z5. 11 d.

Loeb Classical

,

intelligence.

Socrates, however, prodding him with questions, oon4inces him

that without mind or memory or true opinion a man could not know if he was
feeling pleasure at the moment, nor recall that he had ever enjoyed pleasure,
nor consider the manifold pleasures that

he,m~ght

experience in the future.

some intelleotual activity is demanded in the life of man.
would ohoose a life of mere pleasure.

Hence, no one

But no one, also, would choose a life

of mere thought, for who oould ever disoover aiY man leading a life of wisdom and knowledge entirely void of any feeling?

It is a life unnatural for

man.
It is manifest, then, that the good for man is neither all
pleasure nor all thought, but it seems to consist in a mixture of the two.
Although neither of the two oan be identified with the good, beoause they
are not, taken separately, suffioient in themselves, it is possible that
joined together they might be the good.

The disoussion continues on with

pleasure and thought vying for the second prize, the highest place in the •
mixture of the two lives.

The dispute, however, is so olosely linked to the

discussion of the nature and kinds of pleasure that it would only oonfuse us
to follow it up here.

The main point, at least, is established.

Pleasure

is not the good.
In the first book of the Republic we have a definite restatement
of the argument of Gallicles in the Gorgias.

Though no direct mentio~ is

made of pleasure, it is implicit in Thrasymachus' contention that right is
the advantage of the stronger.

Moreover, we are again faced with a strong

defense by a capable opponent of immorality, the obtaining of what one desires by any means whatsoever.

f
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The argument is buH t around the search for a true defini t'ion of
justice, and Socrates' pursuit against immoral claims is much the same as
that in the Gorgias, where the disoussion was pointed towards the disoovery
of the purpose of rhetorio.

It takes a

sligh~ly

different twist, however,

when Thrasymaohus, unlike Polus in the Gorgias, maintains that injustioe is
not disgraoeful, but profitable.
while justioe is the oontrary.

Moreover, injustioe is virtue and wisdom,
Soorates

seour~

the upper hand, when

Thrasymaohus admits that "eaoh man is as his like is.

If the unjust man is

like the wise and good, then he is wise and good, and so for the just man. ,,13
But we see, argues Socrates, that the just man tries to get the better of
only the unjust man, while the unjust man tries to secure an advantage over
both t he just and unjust, for he strives to be superior over all.

The good

and wise craftsman tries to outdo only the foolish and ignorant oraftsman.
Take the example of the musioian.

A musician would not overtighten the

strings of his 1 yre to exoeed another musician, but would try to tighten
them properly only to exoeed a non-musician, or a foolish man, ignorant of
these matters.

The just man is like this good and wise musician, and must,

therefore according to the prinoiple stated, himself be good and wise.
Socrates strengthens his argument by observing that even among
thieves there must be honor in order that hatreds and dissensions may be
•
avoided. In a state, too, or in an army, a family, or in one's own person
justice is the souroe of union, while injustioe creates variances and

13 Plato, The RepUblio, I, translated by Paul Shorey.
Library,-w.m. Heineman, London, 1930, 349 d.

Loeb Classical

,
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renders the state or army or family or person incapable of action.

.'

Thrasymachus' oontention that right is the advantage of the
stronger, by whioh he means that one should have the power to do whatever he
likes and obtain whatever he desires, cannot
Socrates' relentless logic.

~tand

up under the fire of

In the downfall of Thrasymachus we witness

another refutation of the very doctrine, which Callioles upheld in the
Gorgias.

Our own pleasure cannot be the

life tothe exolusion of everything else.

moti~

force and only goal of our

Certainly, then, pleasure is not

the good, which must be the end of all our actions.
It is proper before closing this chapter to disouss here a diffieulty that might be lodged against our claim that Plato was a determined
adversary of the thesis identifying pleasure with the good.

It is a little

baffling at first reading to discover in the Protagoras that Socrates
taking pleasure as the good makes a very plausible argument to prove a particular point and apparently contradiots his strong protestations in other.
dialogues.
Let us review the

pert~'.nent

passage in the Protagoras first, then

we will attempt a reconciliation. 14 Pleasure is introduced into the dialogue in an attempt to decide whether courage like other forms of goodness
already oonsidered oan be said to be a matter of knowledge.

Socrates asks

.

Protagoras whether he would agree with the majority of men in saying that
things are good in so far as they are pleasant. and that painful things are

14 Plato,

Protagoras, IV, translated by W.R.M. Lamb.
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1924. 353 a.

Loeb Classical Library,
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respect of pain, the fewer and smaller should be chosen.
evil are mistaken in their calculation.

.'

But people who do

When they weigh the pleasant

against the painful and find that the painful are out-balanced by the
pleasant, whether the near by the remote, or tpe remote by the near, they
should choose that course of action to Which the pleasant are attached, but
not the course in Which the pleasant are outweighed by the painful.
precisely in this, however, that men err, for
correctly.

~ey

It is

do not measure things

They consider the things of the moment the greater, just as in

the matter of distance.

Objects close up look larger than objects in the

distance, though they are not really so.
pleasure" is a matter of ignorance.

Therefore, this IIbeing overcome by

Men err through a lack of knowledge and,

to be accurate, a knowledge of measurement.
The facility and precision with which Plato states the case for the
common man should not shock us or blind us to the fact that Socrates does not
truly identify himself with hedonistic principles.

To explain away the

apparent contradiotion in Plato's theory of pleasure has not presented an insurmountable obstacle for eminent Plato scholars. 15

Though their explana-

tions vary, they are all in agreement that there is no contradiction nor
change of opinion.
It must be remembered that the argument of pleasure is introduoed

.

into the dialogue only to show that oourage, a form of goodness, is identified with knowledge.

Adopting the fundamental principle of the common man,

..
15 Cf. A.E. Taylor, Plato the Man and His 'Work, Dial Press Ino., New York,
1936) Paul Shorey, What-pra~Said, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1934; G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1935.
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happiness is to be sought by developing and gratifying 6
the appetite for the pleasures of sense and ambition. 1

.'

In the Gorgias. Philebus, and Republic, then, we have treated of
Plato's view of Hedonism as the sole opponent to his theory of pleasure •

.

Wi th t he explanation of the agreement of the'io F'rotagoras with his criticism
of Hedonism we bring to a conclusion the negative section of Plato's theory.

,.

The remaining chapters will deal with the discussion of the positive aspect
of his treatise on pleasure.

f

6 Paul Shorey, "The Unity of Plato's Thought," The Dicennial Publications,
First Series, VI, University of Chicago Press:-Chicago, 1904, 148 (22).
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CHAPTER III
THE ORIGIN, NATURE AND KINDS OF PLEASURE

Plato, as we have seen in the
adversary of Hedonism.

pre~G~s
..

47

ohapter, was deoidedly an

He sternly rejeoted the doctrine whioh identified

pleasure with the good, for it reduoed the ultimate end of all our actions
and desires to the pleasure basis.
of his dialogues.

This stand 4t>lato maintained through all

He was aware, however, in his relentless warfare on

Hedonism that mere refutation of an opponent's thesis will not effeot a oonversion,unless a positive expression of one's one doctrine follows along.
Pleasure may not be the good at which all must aim as the ultimate
end of life to obtain the happy life, whioh all men desire, but pleasure does
have a part in the happy life.

We have already seen that Plato in the

Philebu8 declares a life devoid of all pleasure to be certainly not a human
existenoe.

Some

p~ea8ur~

is demanded by the nature of man.

Henoe we find Plato in his later dialogues attempting to determine
the plaoe of pleasure in the life of man.

To faoilitate the proper place-

ment of pleasure in the scheme of life we will first attend in this ohapter
to Plato's discussion of the origin, nature and variety of pleasure.
Plato's fullest treatment of the positiVe aspect, for having dismissed his negative approach to the subject in the second chapter it is to
the positive expression of his doctrine we now turn, is found in the
Philebus and Republic.

To the Philebus we will first give our attention to

33
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disouss the preliminaries of the question.

We must remember that the thesis of the Philebus is to determine
the relative significance of pleasure and knowledge in the good life of man.
It has already been seen that neither can

ol~m

;.;.

is sufficient in itself to make man happy.

...,

the first plaoe, for neither

However, one may be of more im-

portance than the other in the mixture consistuting the good and happy life.
All reality must be divided into

fou~classes,

the infinite

(;'rrf.tfov), the finite (rr~fo(,,!», the mixed (rI.I(dv), and the cause (""~T:J..).l
The infinite is desoribed best, perhaps, by a few examples.

It is that

which possesses the more or less in its very nature, so that it has no
definite or determined degree, like the hotter and colder, the quioker and
slower, the greater and smaller.

The finite, however, does possess suoh a

limitation and to this olass belong the equal and the double, or whatever is
a definite number or measure.

The third class is olearly understood from

the explanation of the first two, for it comes into being when number or
measure is introduced into the higher or lower tones, for example, so that
a definite harmony is arranged.

The same applies to hot and cold weather to

produce the perfection of the seasons.

The fourth principle, cause, tollows

from the proposition that everything which comes into being, must
necessarily have a cause for its being.

The cause is naturally distinct

both from that which it produces, the generation (t'V~~/~), and that ~ich
is used for the generation, the matter.

I Philebus,

23 c

ft.

The generation, of course, is the

f
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third class of mixture, and the matter is the first and second clas8, the
infinite and finite, which are brought into combination.
Since all reality falls under one of these divisions, knowledge,
pleasure and the mixture of both, which has
life, must take their place.

b~en

agreed upon is the good

It is evident from our explanation of the

three classes to Which class the mixed life belongs.
class.

But what of pleasure?

Pleasure and

pa~

the more or less, that is, they have degrees.

It is of the third

have no limit, but admit of

Therefore, they belong to the

class of the infinite, which has neither a beginning, a middle, nor an end.
To classify mind Socrates appeals to the testimony of all philosophers that
2

"mind is the king of heaven and earth," and that all things in the universe
are not governed by mere chance, but are ordered and directed by mind and a
marvellous wisdom.

Hence, it is agreed, after some little discussion that

mind is certainly akin to cause and thus belongs to the fourth class.
It is here that we enter into the formal discussion most
to our chapter, the origin and nature of pleasure.

pertine~

Socrates' words earlier

in the dialogue aptly introduces our problem •
••• but pleasure I know has various aspects, and ••• we
must consider and examine what her nature is. For
when you just simply hear her name, she is only one
thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of shapes,
which are even, in a way, unlike eaoh other. For instance, we say that a man who li vas without restraint
has pleasure, that the self-restrained man takes
pleasure in his very self-restraint; and again that

2 Ibid., 28 c.

f
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the fool, lIho is full of foolish opinions and hopes is
pleased, and also that the wise man takes pleasure in
his very wisdom. And would not any person, who said
these bo kinds of pleasure were like eaoh other, be
rightlyregarded as a foo11 3

..

Continuing; with the Philebus we will first examine the

orig:I:~in

of

..;

pleasure and throu!h the analysis of its origin arrive at a knowledge ee of its
nature, as far asPlato ohose to define its nature.
Pleasure and pain, as we have seen, bel'flg to the first olae4'1ss,
that of the infinite, since neither admits a limit in its own ooncept.;tt.

We

must now, however,eonsider the subjeot of the pleasures, the receptao4'101o of
the pleasures, aruexamine the aotual conditions of the origin of pleaeeasure
and pain.
that of

It willbe noted that we discuss the question of pain alonsuag with

pleasure,~cause,

as Soorates asserts, pleasure oannot be SUOUlooess-

fully examined apart from pain. 4 Actual pleasure and pain are always as found
or arise in cortam definite degrees in a living creature.
naturally

origina~

Hence, therlhey

in the combined class of the infinite bounded by t

finite, which is the third class of the mixture.

the

The subject of the

pleasures and pains possesses a definite form and at any given moment ;:l; the
pleasures and pains themselves are of a certain definite degree.

f

Pain is !enerated whenever the harmony of nature is disturbed>ed,
that is, whenever the proper functioning of the parts aocording to na...,ature is
impeded or disrupted..

But when this harmony is restored to nature,

pleasure comes into being.

~ Ibid., 12 c d.
Ibid., 31 b.

tH;th~m

To illustrate we may use Plato's own examples.

Hunger is·pain,

beoause it is a dissolution or breaking down process, while eating, which is
the restoration or filling-up process, is

pl~asure.

Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling
wi th moisture of that whioh was drl;e'4, up is a pleasure.

Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration
we experienoe through heat are a pain, but the natural
restoration and oooling are a pleasure.5
Therefore, we see that we have not on.j.y explained the Drigin, but
defined the nature of pleasure.

For

whenever in the class of living beings, whioh ••• arises
outof' the natural union of the infinite and finite, that
union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the
passage and return of all things to their own nature is·
pleasure. 6
In the ninth book of the Republic, also, we find a rather lengthy
disquisition on pleasure, which gives us some insight on the nature of
pleasure as Plato considers it.

The discussion is important both for the

new ideas, Which it introduoes to the theory being expounded, and because
it cDrroborates the definition of pleasure already considered in the
Philebus.
Soorates sets himself to the problem of the nature of pleasure
itself after he has conduoted a consideration of the three parts of the
soul and the three kinds of pleasure proper to eaoh part.
the disoourse we shall take up later in the fourth chapter.

5 Ibid., 32 a.
6 Ibid., 32 b.

This section of

f

Pleasure is opposed to pain and there is a neutral state, ·~ioh is
neither pleasure nor pain.
soul.

This neutral state is a sort of repose of the

People who are sick consider this mere rest and oessation from pain as

the greatest pleasure.

Yet, when these same

~ople

are in good health and

without real pleasure this neutral state seems painful.
pain are really aotive states,

I

movements,K'v~~£'s

•

But, pleasure and

Therefore, the mere ab-

senoe of pain is not pleasure, neither is the m.re absence of pleasure pain.
The state of rest, Which is said to be most pleasant or painful, is merely an
appearance and not a reality, for it is but a matter of comparison with a
previous state of acute pleasure or pain.

MoreoTer, we have confirmation

that pleasure is not cessation from pain, and the opposite, from the faot
that there are some pleasures, whioh are not preoeded by pain, for example,
the pleasures of smell.
There is, then, let us say, an upper, a middle and a lower region.
A person asoending from the lower region to the middle region, through
ignoranoe, might believe that he has reached the upper region, and, conversely,
a man descending from the upper region to the middle region might think that
he has fallen to the lower region.

This is the case of people who are

inexperienoed with the truth and have a wrong estimate of pleasure and pain,
so that very often they oonsider the neutral state of rest as either
pleasant or painful, when it is merely a cessation from one or the other.
It is like making a comparison of black with gray beoause, through ignoranoe
of oolor, the gray is considered white.

f

There tollows then an argument to prove that the pleasure1l of the
Jdnd

a$~re

At the

~

more real and true, and thus superior to the pleasures ot the body.

moment we are not so muoh interested in the process of the argument

and it.;;::;s conclusion, as in the ideas contained ,therein, which support our

view

0 . . 01

;.;.

.."

what Plato considered the nature of pleasure.
Which has more real being, that which is concerned with
the invariable, the immortal, the true, and is found in
the invariable, immortal, true; or t~t which is concerned with the variable and. mortal and is found in the
variable and mortal?7
Clearly, that which is connected with the invariable, for the in-

variab:£ole partakes of knowledge, truth and essential being in the same
degree •••
And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that
whioh agrees with nature, that whioh is more really
tilled with more real being, will have more real and
true joy and pleasure; whereas that which participates
in less real being will be less truly and surely
satisfied, and will participate in a less true and
real pleasure. 8
!herete>-ore we have the oonclusion that
Those who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always
busy with gluttony arid sensuality, go doWll and up
again as far as the middle region; and in this space
they move at random throughout life, but they never
pass into the true upper world; thither they neither
look, nor do t hey ever find their way, neither are
they truly filled wi th true being, nor do t hey taste
of true and abiding pleasure.9

~. The
_6ers~

III, tra~slated by B. Jowett.
M1 i ford, 1924, 585 c.

Dialogues of Plato

Press,

9) Ibid ••• , 585 e.
Ibid.. ., 586 a.
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The Republic thus adds a new note to the analysis of the nature of
pleasUre.

Pleasure is a movement.

But what sort of a movement?

This is a

rather general term, vague enough, which needs to be olarified.

From

Plato's argument in favor of the pleasures of .the mind we find that

pleas~r.

;;. "'I

is a movement, which is connected with a filling-up of that which agrees with
nature.

There is a familiar eoho in these words of the explanation of

pleasure in the Philebus.

Moreover, the

pleas~es

of the mind, which are the

pleasures of the philosopher, are the real and true pleasures.

But,

in the

philosopher's soul every part finds its own pleasure and its own satisfaction
in perfect harmony.'

The definition of the Republic, then, seems to embrace

and is clarified by the definition found in the Philebus.

Pleasure is a

movement which oonsists in the restoration of the harmony of any faculty
aocording to its own nature.
That such was the belief of Plato we have confirmation from a
passage in the Timaeus.

Since it but repeats what we have already

discusse~

we will quote only a brief part of it, more to strengthen the doctrine already expounded than to elucidate our position.
Now, we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way.
An impression produced in us contrary to nature and

f

violent, if sudden is painful; and again, the sudden
return to nature is pleasant, ai8 that which is gentle
and gradual is imperceptible •••
The notions of a sudden return and of the imperoeptibility of certain pleasures will beoome olear from a later explanation of the kinds of

10 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, III, translated by B. Jowett.
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1924, 64 c.

Oxford
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pleasure.
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Vlliat is to be noted especially, here, is the repetition of the

ideas defining the nature of pleasure and pain.

Pain is a dissolution of the

parts of an organi&m contrary to nature but pleasure is the restoration of
the harmonious funotioning of the parts

accor~ing

to nature.

In determining the nature of pleasure only examples of the clearly
physical pleasures were used to illustrate.

Pleasure, it would seem, how-

ever, admits of a greater variety than the mert physical.

The reality of

the various kinds of pleasure, then, we must now study.
The first classification is a distinction between pleasures of the
body and pleasures of the soul.

The matter for our discussion of the kinds

of pleasure will be taken from the Philebus, unless otherwise stated.
The satisfaction of hunger and the quenching of thirst are clearly
physical pleasures, but

If

there is another kind of pleasure and pain, which

belongs to the soul herself, apart from the body, and arises through
expectation. nIl

The pleasure of the soul is a mental anticipation of a

restoration and has its origin in memory.

Because of this connection with

memory, Plato diverts from the main point for a moment to explain just what
is meant by memory and recollection, but for our purpose it is not

f

necessary to relate this Whole discussion.
A man who is hungry or thirsty desires food or drink, or more precisely, being filled with food or drink.

•

It cannot be the body that desires

such repletion, for the body is at the moment undergoing depletion and it
cannot be passing through two antithetic processes at the same time.

11 Philebus, 32 c.

Hence, it is the soul, which desires the repletion and the soul doe~ so in
virtue of the memory of the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.
One in such a state experienoes both pain and pleasure at the same time,
pain, because he is actually in a state of

di~solution

of thirst or hunger,

pleasure. because he anticipates restoration or the filling-up of his hunger
or thirst.
The force of the argument is this.

~noe

the desire of repletion

by means of the memory belongs to the soul, then also, the acoompanying
pleasure must belong to the soul.

And, therefore. the classifioation of

pleasures into those of the body and those of the soul is legitimate.
There is a further point to be noted here.

Beoause of memory. a

person is subject to the feeling of both pleasure and pain at the same time.
There is pain by reason of the bodily sensation of hunger and thirst. but,
since there is also an anticipation of being filled, there is, too. the
pleasure of memory, which belongs to the soul.

Plato wishes to emphasize

that the pleasures we are speaking of are a mixed pleasure, that is, they
are aocompanied by pain of the body, and thuse he paves the way for a distinction between the mixed and the pure pleasures.

There is also another

obvious reason for establishing this pleasure of the soul, namely, to smooth
the path for an introduction of the pure pleasures of the soul, which have
no connection with the body.
Before we arrive at the divisions of the pure pleasures. however,
we are first led to consider the true and false pleasures, which are
immediately suggested by the pleasures dependent on mental anticipation.

f
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Plato wishes to establish that just as there are true and false opinions,
true and false fears, true and false expectations, so there oan be true and
false pleasures, beoause they are based upon true and false hopes and
opinions. 12
Not for a minute does Plato believe that the feeling of pleasure,
though false, is not real; no more than he believes a judgment ceases to be a
fact, because it is false.

Such an objeotion

~not

be leveled at him.

There is such a process as judging and suoh a process as
feeling pleased. For each, then, there is an object,
for we always judge something or are pleased with something. In the case of judging, whether the judgment be
true or false, it does not oeases to be a real judgment.
The same should apply to pleasure. A false feeling of
pleasure, though false, would not cease to be a real
feeling of pleasure. 13
Protarchus, the antagonist in the Philebus, is however, unwilling to eoncede
that pleasure may be false, though he willingly grants that pleasure admits
the qualifications, Ilgreat,1f Ifsmall," "intense lf and even Ilright or wrong."
Pleasure, if it arises through a connection with false belief, is not in itself false, but the judgment only is false.

He will grant nothing further.

We must consider, then, from the beginning that there is such a
f

thing as true and false opinion, and thaF pleasure and pain very often follow
them.

The power of forming opinion comes from perception and memory.

Our

perceptions are like a writer, who writes the things perceived as word, in
our souls, and according as truth or falsity is written in us our opinions
and statements concerning the things perceived will be true or false.

12 Ibid., 36 c.
13 Taylor, Plato the Man and His Work,

421, Cf. Philebus, 37 a-c.
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Then, we might regard memory as a painter, who paints images to picture the
words written in our souls, and again true or false opinions will result
according as the images illustrate true or false words.

.

.

Restricting ourselves to the pleasures and pains of the soul, we
~

have seen that they are based on the anticipation of a future condition.

The

images, which we have just considered, relate to the past and the present,
but especially to the future, "for we are alWay, filled with hopes all our
lives. n14
Often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his
possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he
even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely. Shall we or shall we not say that of these
pictures those are for the most part true which are
presented to the good men, beoause they are friends
of the gods, whereas thos~ presented to the bad are
for the most part false.l~
The point Socrates is driving home he further olarifies.

Opinions

or judgments are true or false if they are, or are not, based upon reality.
The same applies to pleasure.

~

Although one may really feel pleasure, yet, if

it is not based upon reality, either past, or present, or future, it is false
The good man generally has true pleasures beoause he has hopes of things consonant with the wishes of the gods, but the bad man generally has false
pleasures because he desires in a day-dreaming sort of fashion things whioh

.

are not pleasing to the gods, and are impossible of fulfillment, suoh as
massive wealth.

Fear, anger, or any of the other passions might be called

true or false in a similar manner.

14 Philebus, 39 e.
15 Ibid., 40 a b.

It would seem, also, though Protarohus

f
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refuses to allow it, that pleasures are bad only when they are false and
ieceptive.
Socrates, however, defers the dispute on the matter of good and bad
~leasure,

interesting though it be, to insist ?n another argument in proof of
.~

~he

falsity of some pleasures.
It has been determined already that pleasure and pain may exist

side by side when the body is feeling pain but jhe soul is experiencing
pleasure through the anticipation of the opposite condition.

Pleasure and

pain have also been classified as infinite, admitting of degrees.

In each

case it is judgment which determines whether an anticipated pain or pleasure
is greater or smaller or more intense when compared with its opposite or one
another.

But, we saw in the Protagoras that sight is very often deceived in

noting the sizes of things because of distance, so that we often make false
judgments.

The same can happen in the case of pleasure and pain:
because they are seen at various and changing distances
and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison
with the pains, and the pains, in turn, throu~ comparison with the pleasures vary inversely as they.16

Therefore the pains and pleasures do not conform to reality in suoh cases and
are false.
For the opponents of the thorough Anti-Hedonists there is also one
last argument in defense of the division of pleasure into true and fal;e.
The term "thorough Anti-Hedonist" is not used by Plato himself, but by it is
~eant the schooi of thought, whioh spurns entirely the life of pleasure and

~

Ibid.,

I,~

~

b.
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thus seeks to reduce pleasure to a mere negation, the neutral state·'mentioned
above.

Plato, although an adversary of Hedonism, did not deny a certain

positive value to pleasure as we shall see more clearly in our final chapter.
There are three types of life, one pleasant, one painful, and one
neither of the two, so that mere freedom from pain or pleasure is not
indentical with pleasure and pain.

A man, the thorough

says that to live all one's life without pain

\f

Anti-Hedonis~,

who

the pleasantest of all

things errs, for supposing that we have three things, one gold, one silver
and one neither of the two, certainly that which is neither cannot become
either one or the other.

Therefore, those who think they feel pleasure when

there is really a mere absence of pain, experience a false pleasure.
The point of view of the thorough Anti-Hedonist may be made use of
in another way, namely, to classify pleasures according to their intensity.
We have found that pleasure and pain are movements or changes, of which the
dissolution of our natural state is pain and its restoration is pleasure.
Certain philosophers inform us that there is always some change taking
place in our bodies, for everything is in motion.

But, just as we are not

conscious of all the changes in us, for example, of growth and the like, so
we are not conscious of every fluctuation and change causing pleasure and
pain in us.

It is more true to say, that

the great changes oause pains and pleasures in us, but
the moderate and small ones cause no pains or
pleasures at all. 17
Thus we may assume that there are three states of life, one of pleasure,

17

Ibid.,

43

c.
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another of pain, and the last, the state of neither pleasure nor pain, the
neutral state.

The thorough Anti-Hedonist would have us believe that all

pleasure is identified with this neutral state and this outlook on the life
of pleasure is caused by his examination of

.th~

nature of pleasure.

Although

Plato does not agree with the oonolusion of the Anti-Hedonist, in fact,
vigorously rejects it, still the probing of the Anti-Hedonist into the
problem of pleasure enables Plato to rank pleas.res in the order of
intensity.
The oommonest and most intense pleasures are without doubt the
physioal pleasures, and, morever, not the physioal pleasures oonneoted with
health and moderation, but those found in disease.

People, who are ill,

experience great pain and suffering, and as a oonsequence, when pleasure does
follow it is felt to be more intense and greater.

For example, one who is

suffering from a violent fever, experiences an intense thirst, and feels the
most intense pleapure from a cooling drink.

It is true of course that the

~

diseased do not experience greater pleasure in the sense of a greater number
of pleasures.

We are speaking only of the degree of intensity.

If we oonsider further we shall observe that not only in a
diseased body, but also in a diseased soul is the life of pleasure most
intense.

The self-restrained and virtuous, because they follow the

prinoiple, IJl'r'I£~V :~d..V ," avoid the extremely pleasant and seek only the
more moderate, but the unrestrained and dissolute revel in riotous living and
pursue only the greatest pleasure.

Henoe, we find that in the order of

intensity the physical pleasure rank highest and of these, not those, which

f

.'

exist in virtue, but those which exist in some depravity of soul or body, are
the most intense.
It was precisely because of this result of the examination of
pleasure that the thorough Anti-Hedonist

refr~ined

from attributing the name

of pleasure to such depraved conditions and defined pleasure as a mere
absence of pain.

Plato, however, while admitting the truth of their examina-

tion, rejected their fastidious conclusion

and~octrine.

Plato's conclusion

will be seen in the fourth chapter.
We have arrived now at the final analysis and classifioation of
pleasures. that of the mixed and pure pleasures.

All of the pleasures we

have treated to this point of our thesis have been mixed with some pain, but
now we shall find that the highest and truest pleasure is the pure pleasure,
free from all pain.

Let us first dismiss the mixed pleasures.

Some mixtures are concerned with the body only. and some
belong only to the soul and are in the soul. and we
shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to the soul and to the body. and the~e are
sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains. l

...

Short work is made of the mixed pleasures of the body and of the
body and soul together, for we have seen examples of these pleasures in our
previous classifications.

The mixed pleasures of the body occur,

whenever ••• anyone has two opposite feelings. as we are
sometimes coldA but growing warm, or are hot, but are
growing cold. l ),

18 Ibid.,

46

.c.

19 Ibid., 46 c.
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The mixed pleasures of the body and soul occur, When the body feels some such
want as thirst or hunger, but the soul experiences the joys of anticipation.
The final mixture, that which pertains to the soul alone, though
it requires slightly more ample explanation,
•

~ince
4'7

we have not discussed it

hitherto, is likewise easily disposed of.
Anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy are generally
reckoned to be pains of the soul.
joined with great pleasures?

But, do we

find that they are also

~t

Our reactions to the performance of tragedies

and oomedies furnish us with the be.t examples.

It is a well-known fact that

we enjoy the tragedy, though we weep in sympathy for the oharacters.
souls experienoe pleasure and pain simultaneously.

Our

The oase of the oomedy

is not so evident, but from a brief analysis we will observe that it also
exemplifies the mixed pleasure of the soul.
Envy, we have admitted, is a pain of the soul, but there is
pleasure mixed with it, because we see the envious man rejoioing in the misfortune of his neighbors.

Ignoranoe, we also agree, is an evil.

is involved with ignoranoe and envy.
not know himself:

Now comedy

There are three ways in which one may

first, in regard to wealth, he thinks himself richer than

he is; seoond, in regard to physical qualities, he thinks himself handsomer
or taller than he is; third, in regard to qualities of the soul, he thinks
that he excels in virtue and wisdom, When he does not.

All who plaoe them-

selves into one of these foolish olasses of oonoeit are either powerful or
weak.

If they are weak and unable to revenge themselves, their self-

ignoranoe is ridiculous and they are laughed at.

Hence we laugh at the

f
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false oonoeits of our friends in regard to their strength, wi,dom ~d so
forth.

But, ignoranoe is a misfortune, so we are laughing at the misfor-

tunes of friends, and pleasure in the misfortune of friends is oaused by the
feeling of envy, which is a pain of the SOUl.,
;.;. --7
Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the
ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure
with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have
agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and
that laughter is a pleasure, yet the8P two are present
at t he same time on such occasions. 2
There are also unmixed pleasures and these are the pure pleasures
towards which the whole disoussion of the olassification of pleasures has
been pointing as a olimax.

They are defined as

those arising from what are oalled beautiful colors or
from forms, most of those that arise from odors and
sounds, in short, all those the want of which is unfelt and painless, whereas the satisfaction furnished
by them is felt by the senses, pleasant and unmixed
with pain. 21
Plato oontinues on to express a little more clearly and definitely that he

~

does not mean by beauty of form such things as defined piotures of animals
and paintings, but the pure geometrical forms, whioh are absolutely
beautiful by nature and have no likeness to such pleasures as the scratohing
of an itoh or the more vulgar pleasures.
I mean that those sounds which are smooth and olear and
send forth a single pure note are beautiful, not relatively, but absolutely, and that there are pleasures,
which pertain to these by nature and result from them. 22

20 Ibid., 50 a.
21 Ibid., 51 b.
22 Ibid •• 51 d.
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The pleasures of smell, though they are not of an exalted rank, truly belong
to this class, because they are not conditioned by a previous state of pain.
To these pleasures of color, sound and $uell, must finally be
added the pleasures of knowledge, for they are, not preceded by pain, since

..

.;.,

neither a lack of knowledge is painful like the pain of hunger, nor is the
condition of having forgotten something that we would like to know on a particular occasion, a painful feeling in itself llke the process of growing
hungry after we have eaten.
Such are the pure pleasures.

In them we have reached the crowning

point of our whole analysis and classification of pleasure.

They differ

from all preceding types of pleasure in that they are entirely free from any
antecedent pain and are not caused by contrast with any pain, but are always
pleasant by their own nature.

In their highest degree they oonsist in a

contemplation of the pure colors, pure mathematical forms, in the oontemplation of beauty and truth.

They fulfil the conditions of our definition

mos~

perfectly for they bring our nature into the fullest harmony with all that
is beautiful and true absolutely.

Although they overflow upon the senses

and by neoessity use bodily functions as instruments, primarily they are
pleasures of the soul.

Unlike the mixed pleasures, whioh are very often

oharacterized by violence and intensity, they are well-ordered and
moderate.

Finally, they are the truest pleasures, for just as we could say
that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful
and truer than a great deal of mixed white,23

23 Ibid., 53 b.

f
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so we may say

.'

that any pleasure, however small or infrequent, if
uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more
beautiful and more true than a great or often
repeated pleasure without purity.G4

f

24 Ibid., 53 b c.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ETHICAL VALUE OF PLEASURE IN PLATO'S THEORY

Having dismissed Plato's

adversa~i8ft
.,.

47

and de£ined the nature o£

plee.Sl.8 asure, as PIa to conceived it, we come now to t he most important task of
assi@l igning the proper place to pleasure in Plato's scheme of life.
That the question of the moral forcl and value of pleasure was
imponoortant to Plato we have no doubt when we consider that it was a problem,
whictlo ch occupied him, at least indirectly, from t he very first of his dialoguElJrues to the latest.

and the Laws, it is connected withthe major issues and Plato shows

Repu~~blic

his

0

Moreover, in his two most important dialogues, the

concern £or the problem of pleasure by his careful treatment of the

questts stion.
The purpose of this chapter will be to trace the progression of
PlatoMo' s thoughts through the various dialogues in which he chose to treat O't
pleas&asure in regard to the conduct of one's life.

It must be remembered

that rt it is not within the scope of this thesis to criticize or evaluate,
but

IOl

merely to record Plato's theory of pleasure.

There is sufficient

diffiltficulty in this task in itself, for as has been mentioned be£ore, Plato
showev~ved

no interest in the formation of theories and systems on each

ques~&3tion

stud~bdent

and he did not make the systematizing o£ his thought easy for the
of his writings.

Each dialogue is a unit in itself and, though

ther~1re is a main idea or theme to each, yet the pursuit of the truth on each
poin~ont is carried on in such fashion that a variety of topics are touched

53
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wi thstand the assaults of so open and frank: an adversary as we meet in

Callicles.

Complete self-indulgence is the point of Callicles' arguments,

and consequently the dialogue is concerned entirely with the pleasures of
the body.

The higher pleasures are dismissed ,with barely a mention.

Plato's attitude to such a life is

ever hostile.

His strong defense of the

life of a philosopher by contrast creates in us the impression that Plato is
the stern defender of a life devoid of all

ple~ure.

The truth of the

matter is, however, that he is a staunoh upholder of the life devoid of suoh
pleasures as Callicles advocates.

And this is oonsonant with his later

views.
The latter part of the Gorgias could easily be included in any of
the dialogues pertinent to our thesis.

Plato proclaims that a man, who

wants to be happy and guide his life in friendship with both God and man,
should be temperate and control his violent desires in order to be just and
brave and pious.

Harmonyor order is the source of goodness.

is well-ordered it will be good and consequently happy.

If the soul ".

To be well-ordered

the soul must be temperate and wise, just, pious and courageous.

The life,

which makes pleasure its guiding-star, will never reach this goal, but the
life of philosophy, which fights against pleasure

and pursues righteousness

and virtue, will attain the good and happy life, here and hereafter.

.

The connection of the Gorgias and Protagoras has already been
touohed upon in our

expl~ation

of the opposite stand which the Protagoras

seems to take to the identification of pleasure and the good.

Convinoed as

we are that there is no contradiction involved in the doctrine of the

f
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protagoras, it must be admitted, nevertheless, that the tone of the

protagoras is more lenient.

.'

For the average man, it is accepted, pleasure

and pain are the only norms of the good and the bad.
sidered, being overcome by pleasure, which is

But even thus con-

~ecognized

as bad, is but a

miscalculation and wrong choice of an immediate pleasure, because it appears
greater at the moment than the pain to which it leads.
For the common mass of people, then,
required to correct their calculations.

~science

of measurement is

Thus knowledge, which may be

equated with the life of philosophy, again becomes our aim.
Plato is less stern in that he grants that pleasure and pain must
be the norm of conduct for the average man, because the ordinary people are,
perhaps, incapable of anything higher, but Plato is consistent ,with his doctrine by maintaining that the average man must be instructed and trained in
his calculations, so that he chooses the truest and lasting pleasures.
Turning to the Phaedo we find a very definite and emphatic
tion of

~~e

pleasures.

separa-~

soul and the body, and, consequently, of their respective
The spirit of the Phaedo seems to be even more antagonistic than

the Gorgias in its outlook upon the pleasure-principle in man.

f

Socrates is on the point of death, and, as we might expect, the
topic of the soul and its immortality is uppermost in his mind.

Death is

just what the philosopher seeks all his life, for death delivers the so~l
from the body.

The

t~le

philosopher ought to reckon the body of no account

first, because the pleasures of the body distract him from the pursuit of
knowledge, secondly, because the bodily organs are not dependable witnesses
of the truth.

The soul which has all its life long been given to the sa"W.sfaction
of the bodily desires and the pursuit of the pleasures of tIle bod:,r will be
dravm down to the earth and wi 11 wander about haunting tombs, until it is
fettered to another body.

The nature of the body into which the soul is re;;.

.."

born will be determined by the condition of its wrong-doing.

Those given to

the sensual pleasures of excessive eating and drinking 'will be given the
bodies of asses or like animals.

Those hardened in violence and injustice

•

will return into wolves and hawks and such like beasts of prey.

Those, too,

who have practiced temperance and injustice without any intelligence or knowledge of the good will receive some more gentle social nature, as the body of
bees or ants, or may even receive the body of man and give birth to moderate
men like themselves.
Only the soul of the philosopher will return to the gods, because
he has surrendered the delights and lusts of the body, not like the lovers of
money from a fear of poverty, nor like the lovers of power and honor from a
fear of ill-repute, but because philosophy has taught him the worthlessness
of the senses and that a soul imprisoned in the body can never have communion with the pure and divine.

Socrates, thus, declares at the conclusion
I

of the remaining discussion on the soul,
1fuerefore, let a man be of good cheer about his soul,
Who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the
body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their
effects, and followed after the pleasures of knowledge
in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own
proper jewels, which are temperance and justice and
courage and nobility and truth ••• 1
1 Plato, fhe Dialogues of Plato, II, translated by B. Jowett.

University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1924, 114 e.
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A sterner rejection of plee sure and e. more complete defense of the
worth of the soul and of true knowledge will scarcely be found elsewhere in
Plato's works.

Are we to admit a contradiction then between the doctrine of

the Phaedo and the doctrine of the Gorgiasaqd Protagoras, as we interpreted
;.;.

...,

it?
The dramatic setting is, we believe, important for the understanding of the Phaedo.
Socrates upon earth.

Plato is rendering an accoknt of the last hours of
The thoughts expressed are just what we might expect

to come from Socrates on the occasion.

Poised on the brink of death,

Socrates would naturally underrate the value of pleasure and would enhance
the value of the soul and its activities.

Note well, also,that it is the

pleasures of the body and those in excess that he especially berates.

To

conduct one's life under the guidance of knowledge, and in so far as
possible, a knowledge of absolute values and the Supreme Good, is his ideal.
In the other-worldly atmosphere_ of the dialogue it ought not to be wonderea.
at, that he extends this ideal to its furthest limits.
Finally, all pleasure is not even here excluded from the highest
t;jrpe of life.

There are

hi[~her

pl::;asures, though they are mentioned but

once, which accompany the 1 i:'e of the true philosopher and make it an object
of desire.

Plato does not choose to elaborate the point here, however, and

if we wishto fill out and complete our pic:ture we must look to other
dialogues.
In the dovm-to-earth spirit of the Symposium

we certainly find a

more balanced concept of the companionship of soul and bcdy.

"The philoso-

I

01

the highest in point of intensity.

.'

This is but a preparation for further

proof in the ninth book that the philosopher not only experiences p19asure,
the truest and highest, but the most pleasure.
In the eighth book a distinction is ,made between the necessary and
unnecessary pleasures.

The necessary pleasures are the simple desires, which

demand satisfaction by our nature, cannot be put aside and when satisfied
confer some benefit upon us.
opposite.

The unnecessary 8Jeasures are entirely the

They can be repressed and should be. for they are contrary to our

nature and when indulged do us harm.
using Plato's examples.

Let us make the distinction clear by

A necessary pleasure is the eating of simple food,

which produces health and strength in our bodies and without which we could
scarcely carryon our work.

The unnecessary pleasures of eating are those

which go beyond the ordinar;y fare and not

onl~r

cause harm to the body, but

also distract the soul in its pursuit of knowledge and virtue.
The distinction is noteworthy for its more moderate view of the
physical pleasures.

-

Plato acknowledges that smme physical pleasures are de-

manderi by our nature and are. therefore, good for us.

The necessary

pleasures, then. are to be considered a part of the good life. which is the
goal of all men's desires.
V:e approach now the more lengthy discu ssion of pleasure in the
ninth book.

.

The question broached in the first book is again taken up.

is the happier, the good man or the bad?

Who

To decide the question properly we

must consider that there are three parts in the soul and a pleasure proper to
each.

Corresponding to each of these three parts and their distinctive

I
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There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the rleasure
of that part of the S01l1 v;hereb~' we learn is the sweetest,
and the life 0:::' the man in whom that part don'.inates is
the most plen.surable. 3
The second place falls to the lover of honor and to the lover of
money and the physical p128.s11res is allotted9tire last place.
There fo110'/[s then a discussion of the trueness of the pleasures of

.

each life, but since it adds nothinc tc ,mat 1;,e halTe already considered we
shall omit it.

Plato's final words on t'1e ques+;ion are, however, an import-

ant completion of our problem:
Then may Vie not confidently declare that in both the gainloving and the contentious part of our nature all the
desires that wait upon lrnowledge and reason, and, pursuing
their pleasures in conjunction ·-wi th them, te.ke only these
pleasures which reason approves, will, since they follow
truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is
pOdsi ble for them, ond also the plee.sures that are proper
to them and their own, if for e ver;ythin s that which is best
may be said to be most its own. 4
In the Philebus we find much the same doctrine as has been expressec
in the Republic.

AlthouSh it may seem repetitious, a sur::unation of the con-

tAnts of the Philebus will be of confirr'latory value.
The mixture of knowled:"e and pleasure

~'Jas

det8rI:'ined as the good
I

life for r.:.en.

Each were then considered separately and in detail.

The dia-

10{;u8 cone ludes ,vi th a final di scussion of the mixture.
The good and perfect life demands a mixture of pleasure and •
knovr1edGe, because either by itself would be acceptable to no one.

3
1
Ll

Pl"'.to, Republic, II, translated by Paul Shorey.
583 a.
Ibid., 586 d.

\',;m. Heineman, London, 1935,

Three

Loeb :lassieal Library,

64

.'

thinGs :must be added to make this mixture perfect, namely, truth, measure and
proportion, and c eauty, since beauty is an offspring of measure and proportion.

All three Might well be considered the cause of the goodness of the

mixture, and hence a.re to be rated first in the scale of the good.
4- OIl;

Knowledge

since it is most akin to measure and proportion, beauty and truth, must follow after in the next place.

The last plac'3 falls to the pure pleasures

alo!"_;; v'fith the necessary pleasures join3d to hettlth and self-restraint and
without which our natura is unable to exist.
pleasures, which are the excessive physical

The intense and greatest
enjoJ~ents,

are accounted of no

value, because they create hindrances and disturbances to the good and
happiest life.

Hence they are excluded.

Our steps lead us finally to the Laws.

This is the :nature product

of Plato';:, old age, rich with experience and a lifetime of thought.

Hare, if

anywhere, we should expect to find a definite, sane and well-balanced
philosophy of life.

It is noteworthy, then, to discover the Laws in accord-

with the doctrine we have seen

ex~ressed

in Plato's earlier dialogues.

If

there is anything new, it is
an even fuller reconciliation to pleasure and a fuller
incorporation of it as a nec~ssary and valuable
ingredient of the good life./
The subject of pleasure is especially connected with the regulation
of education.

It is important to train the youth in the proper choice of

pleasures, for 'whoever is bIlought up

5 Grube, 82.

I

unacquainted wi tr. the greatesat pleasure and unused to
endure ~id ti~e temptations oC)f pleasure and is not
disciplined to refrain from a A 11 thing s avil, the sweet
feeling of pleasure will over-::-come ••• 6
~~ducation

must begin with the proper tr-::-aining of the pleasure-instinct, for

virtue and vice manifest themselves to
ard pain.

child"I-et. under the gtdse of pleasure

If the young are taught to l-Love the proper pleasures consonant

voith virtue, when they do attain knowleedge, they will find their souls in

•

harmony wi th reason, and thi s harmony i.i s virtue.

It should, moreover, be an of "'_'fense ·worthy of the severest punishment to assert that wicked men lead pIe easant lives.

We must not admit that

there are two separate lives, the right;:;eous and the pleasant, fer no one
would choose any life devoid of

pleasur~e.

According to the judgment of the

just me.n the righteous life is the most;:; pleasant.

Justice and pleasure are

inseparable companions ar..d fom the hapopiest and holiest life.
ment coming from a better soul must be

This judg-

true.

There remains but one sectionul in the fifth book to be considered.
It is important in so far as it recalls; again the use of the calculus
already noted in the Protagoras.
I

Pleasures and pains and desir-as are a part of human
nature, and on then: every mar-tal being must of
necessity hang and depend vrit:~h the most eager interest.
iilld therefore, we must praisee the noblest life, not
only as the fairest in a::-pear·-ance, but, if a man ,viII
only taste and not as in the
days of youth run away to

6

Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, V, traLnslated by B. Jowett.
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 19: 1 24, 114 e.
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another, he will find that this nobler life surpasses also
in the very thing which all of us desire, I me~ in having
the breatest pleasure and the least of pain durin~ the
whole of life. 7

V.e must balance pleasure with pleesure and pain wi th pain in the comparison
of lives, for all the lives of men are
If we find

El.

.

chose~hy re~son

of pleasure and pain.

me.n choosing a life, which is less pleasant than another we can

sa:/ only that the choice is made through ignorance and inexperience •

•

':'Ie may say that there are four lives, the temperate, the rational,
the courageous and the hee.l thful to which are opposed the intemperate, the
foolish, the cowardly and the diseased lives.

Judging the one class against

the Dther merely on the basis of pleasure we are forced to acmit that the
temperate, wise, courageous and heal thy are far superior to their opposites.
And thus we must conclude that
generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of
body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life and far
superior in beauty, rectitude, excellence, goodness and
reputation, and causes him who lives gccordingly to be
infinitely happier than the opposite.
From beginning to end Plato was ever opposed to a life dominated by
pleasure, a life which has no other goal but pleasure.

The Gorgias and
I

Phaedo are stern outbursts of his righteous indignation and well represent
his fervid opposition to the doctrine which reduced our life to a mere
grovelling for the intense physical pleasnres.

~ Ibid., 732 o.
Ibid., 734 e.
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Pluto's severity, hOl'ITever, did not prevent him from seeing the
fundamental t ruth which Hedonism exaggerated.

Pleasure 'we must have in our

lives, for it is rooted in our very nature to strive for happiness, and

...

pleasure is a part of happiness.

Our mistake,lies in this, that we wrongly
.,
invert the proposition that the good life is always pleasant into the dogma
that pleasure is the good, which should permeate and guide our life.

the duty of education to correct our false

opi~on

It is

and show us in what the

good life consists.
The well-ordered life of the philosopher, guided by reason and
knowledge, is the noblest life.

The philosopher reaches up into the abso-

lute a.'1d studies the nature of things, because our nature will be developed
and perfected only when we live in conformity with the absolute values of
truth, beauty and goodness.
Bveryone, however, cannot be expected to have the mind of the
philosopher, and the young must reach the philosopher's perfection by slow_
stages.

For these people pleasure may be assumed as the standard of conduct,

but they must be made to realize that even then their choice of pleasures
should be based upon knowledge.

To live a life of riotous pleasure-seeking

is V'Trong, because it is chosen in ignorance of the truest g,nd lasting
pleasures.

Their choice of pleasures is a short-sighted calculation, and

they never attain the happy life for which they are seeking.

They must be

instructed and trained to make the proper caloulations for themselves, or
failing that, to trust the calculations of the philosopher, who bases his
life upon a genuine knowledge of the good.

}:t'ollowing the footsteps of the

I
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philosopher they wi 11 lead the good life and "vill come to taste its true
pleasures, so that the false and deceitful pleasures can never tempt them
to turn aside.

I
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